

Modernism and Antimodernism

THEORIES, VISIONS, IDEOLOGIES, POLITICS

An International Conference

Hosted by **Cuvântul**

Organized by
The National Museum of Romanian Literature
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Sponsored by



Tinerimea Română Hall, 19 Johann Gutenberg Street, Bucharest
Registration: 021.311.91.11, redactie@cuvantul.ro; Info: www.cuvantul.ro

Foreword

Arguably, the single most important theme in the history of modern and postmodern Europe is the dialectical nexus modernism-antimodernism. This dialectics has resulted in and was predicated upon esthetic avant-gardes, on theories, visions, and radical ideologies ranging from the extreme Right to the extreme Left, authoritarian/totalitarian party-states, scientific-technological revolutions, and everything else one encounters between lifestyles and worldviews.

Romania is an exemplary case in point, as it has been the meeting ground, seedbed, starting point and setting of most modernisms and antimodernisms: Tzara, Eliade, Cioran, Ionesco, Brancusi (to name but a few) are household names all over Europe. Thus, Bucharest is an ideal location for a conference on these topics. Modernism and antimodernism are among the haunting dilemmas, and controversies of our country eversince Romaniats “multiple modernities” have started to unfold, and – more than occasionally – turn sour.

This conference aims at exploring the main concepts, the most salient developments, and the most enduring legacies of European modernism and antimodernism. The idea of the conference originated in a lively exchange between Sorin Antohi, Roger Griffin, and Marius Turda, centering on the possibility of bringing together several paradigmatic conversations on modernism and antimodernism, and on the challenge of coming up with a comprehensive vision of the issue, beyond East-West cleavages of all sorts, beyond disciplinary boundaries and theoretical canons. To further develop a link to the Romanian intellectual and academic scene, and to highlight a strong Romanian theoretical

tradition (developed both in Romania and abroad), Sorin Alexandrescu was invited to join this steering committee.

The conference is hosted, organized, and generously sponsored by a number of institutions, organizations, persons. Let them all be thanked. It is hoped that such events are to be followed by many more, as our monthly, *Cuvântul*, is launching a new series as part of a larger program carried out in collaboration with various partners. Based on the proceedings, collective volumes and other publications are envisaged, in both English and Romanian. Already, the September issue of our monthly discusses the same topic, “Modernism and Antimodernism”, which is also tackled by the associated collective volume.

On behalf of the many people who have worked to make this happen, and on behalf of all the persons, institutions, and organizations who have supported our project, I would like to welcome you all, with special, warm greetings to our foreign guests, most of whom are in Romania for the first time.

Schedule

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 19

15:00-16:00 **Welcoming Remarks**

Chair: Sorin Antohi

Remarks by:

HE Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, The Prime-Minister of Romania

Sorin Oprescu, Lord Mayor of Bucharest

A Representative of the Ministry of Culture and Religious Denominations

Radu Călin Cristea, Director of the National Museum of Romanian Literature

16:00-16:15 Break

16:15-17:00 **Panel One: Keynote Address**

Chair: Sorin Antohi

Roger Griffin: (Western) Modernity + Anti-(existing) Modernity="Modernism" (?)

17:10-17:30 Break

17:30-19:00 **Panel Two**

Chair: Jörn Rüsen

Keith Hitchins: The Challenge of Modernism: The Orthodox Response in Interwar Southeastern Europe

Sorin Antohi: Modernism, Antimodernism, and the Transfiguration of the National: Ethnic Ontologies in Interwar Europe

Balázs Trencsényi: Radical Discourses of Identity in Interwar East Central Europe: Political Romanticism, Konservative Revolution, and Anti-Modernism

19:30 Formal Ceremony and Cocktail at Palace Elisabeta, the Official Residence of the Royal House of Romania, hosted by Her Royal Highness, Princess Margareta of Romania, and His Royal Highness, Prince Radu of Romania. By special invitation only.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 20

9:00-10:30 **Panel Three**

Chair: Keith Hitchens

Peter Fritzsche: The Conceit of Modernity

Marius Turda: Modernism and Visions of National Perfection

Attila Melegh: Modernism and Antimodernism as a False Dichotomy in the Context of the Global Hierarchies of the 20th Century

10:30-11:00 Break

11:00-12:30 **Panel Four**

Chair: Balázs Trencsényi

Maria Stavrinaki: War, Modernism, and Apocalypse: The Ambivalences of the Sacral

Victor Rizescu: Developmental Ideology or Regenerative Nationalism? Competing Strands of the Romanian Right Before World War Two

Constantin Iordachi: Totalitarianism as Alternative Modernization: Fascism and Communism in Comparison

12:30-16:00 Break

16:00-17:30 **Panel Five**

Chair: Erwin Kessler

Stephen Bury: Exhibiting the Avant-Garde
Mark Antliff: Vorticism, Violence, and Modernity:
The Life and Art of Henri Gaudier-Brzeska
Patricia Leighten: Abstracting Anarchism: Elisée Reclus,
Frantisek Kupka, and the Project of Modernist Art

17:30-18:00 Break

18:00-19:30 **Panel Six**

Chair: Sorin Alexandrescu

Augustin Ioan: Built Romanianness: The Century-Old
Obsession with 'National Identity'

Erwin Kessler: On De-modernization

Caius Dobrescu and *Sorin Adam Matei*: Latent
Crusaders. Cosmic Conflict and the Modernization of
the Romanian Intellectual Class

20:00 Concert: Harry Tavitian

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 21

9:00-10:30 **Panel Seven**

Chair: Lazăr Vlăsceanu

Răzvan Pârâianu: Romanian National Culture as an
Antimodernist Project

Paul Cernat: Modern and Antimodern in the Interwar
Romanian Novel

Sorin Alexandrescu: Modernists and Antimodernists:
Enemies or Friends?

10:30-11:00 Break

11:00-12:30 **Panel Eight**

Chair: Marius Turda

Anastasia Nikolopoulou: Melodrama's Modern
Illnesses and Cures: From Coleridge to Peter Brooks,
1816-1975

Claude Karnoouh: Tradition and Modernity: Notes on
an Old Debate

Mihai Spariosu: Utopia, Exile, and Ludic Liminality in
Modernism and Postmodernism

12:30-12:45 Break

12:45-13:30 **Concluding Remarks**

Chairs: Roger Griffin, Sorin Antohi

Modernists and Antimodernists: Enemies or Friends?

I. Three older assumptions about modernism and modernity – their similarity, their homogeneity and the affinity of modernism with (only) liberal and left wing politics – have come recently under heavy attack. Instead, different books revealed the last years that (aesthetic and social) modernism rather opposed (capitalist and materialist) modernity, that modernism has been akin also to right wing politics (Roger Griffin) and that it showed inner division between “strict” and “alternative” modernists, the last ones having adopted a rather critical stance on some common principles (*Les Antimodernes*, by Antoine Compagnon).

In spite of their differences, all these opinions do no longer discuss modernism only in terms of artistic achievements but also in terms of its political, social and general cultural substructures. I completely agree with this and so does a whole research group related to the Center of Excellence in Image Studies (CESI) that spent the last three years studying the social and cultural aspects of the Romanian inter-war Modernism.

In the following, I shall restrict my remarks to the book of Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism* - a real turning point in Modernism studies - because we can find in it all the above-mentioned points of view.

II. The book is very convincing in taking into account the existence of a rightist inter-war modernism, supported by the Nazi and Fascist regimes of Germany and Italy, next to the earlier accepted left wing modernism of Russian constructivists and different Marxist groups in Western Europe. Nevertheless,

some theoretical aspects demand further discussion. While both tendencies promote modernism, it is obvious that they do it in quite different ways: they contradict not only one another, but also the modernism in non-totalitarian countries. This complex situation was possible only because a kind of general system of values assigned at that time in Europe different political and cultural positions to each variant. Our task should be then to sketch such a system of (weberian) “ideal types”, as Roger Griffin rightly says.

Further, opposition was not the only relation between modernism and modernity: while many novels and paintings expressed in an allegorical way (see Adorno, Marcuse) some contemporary crises, they did not assert the decadence of the Western society and the necessity to embark on a quest for transcendental values, a generalization Roger Griffin pleads for.

MARK ANTLIFF

Vorticism, Violence, and Modernity: The Life and Art of Henri Gaudier-Brzeska

In my talk I will examine the Vorticist sculptor Henri Gaudier Brzeska’s French activist roots to consider how various types of violence, culled from the spheres of politics, ideology and popular culture, helped shape Gaudier’s life and art from 1910 to his death in the trenches of World War One in 1915. Having moved to London from Paris in January, 1911, Gaudier-Brzeska rose to prominence in 1914, when he joined the poet Ezra Pound and artist Wyndham Lewis in founding the Vorticist movement. As I will show Gaudier’s ongoing engagement with

anarchism led him to endorse aestheticized violence as a form of resistance to the punitive force of the State, whether as judicial sentencing, police repression, or compulsory service in the military. Though in support of radically different agendas, both the anarchists and the French State sought to justify acts of violence on moral and aesthetic grounds. These conflicting discourses became mutually reinforcing once the anarchists and socialists shifted their justification to support of the war effort on the eve of World War One. Thus violence was integral not only to Gaudier-Brzeska's avant-gardism and his experience of modernity, but to the programmatic fusion of art and life that led him to abandon his antimilitarism and enlist in the French army in August, 1914.

SORIN ANTOHI

Modernism, Antimodernism, and the Transfiguration of the National: Ethnic Ontologies in Interwar Europe

Starting under the auspices of the palingenetic Romanticism of the European generation of 1848, modern discussions about national specificity or national essence have remained for half a century in the spheres of esthetics, symbolic geography, and national characterology. Under the impact of modernism (and of its negative double, equally obsessed with the future: antimodernism), these definitions of ethnicity undergo a radical turn after World War One, against the background of the rise of Western fascisms (a darker wave of palingeneticism) and of their Eastern counterparts. Simply put, in the span of a generation, Europe goes all the way from (usually metaphysical) esthetics to (usually racist) biopolitics.

Thus, national characterology becomes a collection of variations on the theme of ethnic stigma or on the related theme of national (later, racial, superiority); symbolic geography emphasizes both every ethnic nation's isolationism and its geocultural and geopolitical ambitions, up to (micro)imperialist visions and projects; finally, ethno-national esthetics (a paradigm whose metaphysical and mystical accents were already present in its Romantic formula) is inserted into a more ambitious project, not devoid of the elements of a political religion: ethnic ontology.

Consequently, Europe's ethnic nations are endowed with complete worldviews: time (not just history), space (not just territory), Being (not just national character) are understood as ontological (pseudo)categories. And when ethnic ontology itself goes through a crisis and proves to be insufficient for the 'transfiguration' of the country (from ethnies to society to the state understood as a total and messianic intuition-community), modernist science enters the stage and generates a biopolitics.

The paper outlines this phenomenon and provides a number of illustrations from several European national cultures.

STEPHEN BURY

Exhibiting the Avant-Garde

The British Library exhibition, 'Breaking the Rules: the printed face of the Avant Garde, 1900-1937' had over 123,000 visitors between November 2007 and March 2008. This paper looks behind the scenes at the evolution of the exhibition conceptually, its design and construction, associated events, publications, audience and impact. It will place the exhibition in the context of other recent exhibitions in Paris and London

on Dada, Modernism, Surrealism and one-person and group shows of avant-garde artists. It will also look at how some Web 2.0 approaches can be used to reach audiences.

PAUL CERNAT

Modern and Antimodern in the Interwar Romanian Novel

Presentation in Romanian. Simultaneous translation
by **SORIN ANTOHI**

The much-heralded modernization of the interwar Romanian novel went hand in hand with a critical attitude towards modernity/modernization and, sometimes, with an obviously antimodern, 'reactionary' attitude on an ideological level. Usually present in the case of the Moldavian prose writers – Mihail Sadoveanu, Cezar Petrescu, Ionel Teodoreanu –, but also in the case of those from Wallachia, such as Mateiu Caragiale, Mircea Eliade (*Întoarcerea din rai, Huliganii, Domnișoara Christina*), etc., this antimodern modernity or retro modernity does not only imply an anti-bourgeois attitude, generalized in the literary milieu, but (also) a regressive fantasy, a nostalgia of the Golden Age and of a Paradise lost. The critique of modernity is itself a modern epiphenomenon, just as, in Mateiu Caragiale's work, the vehement of 'Balkan' mores expresses his oeuvre's deep 'Balkanism'. Starting from the ideas of Antoine Compagnon (*Les Antimodernes*) and Virgil Nemoianu (*A Theory of the Secondary*), the paper sets out to register the symptoms of a return of the repressed, and of an artistically productive *passéisme*, frequently contested by the advocates of liberal modernization.

Latent Crusaders. Cosmic Conflict and the Modernization of the Romanian Intellectual Class

Presentation by Caius Dobrescu

Over time, Romanian intellectuals have developed the ipsative and antidialogic (and by implication illiberal) attitudes and values specific to a Gnostic sect. While this idea is not entirely new, its use was until now rather metaphorical and it was applied only to the last decades of the 20th century. Our paper investigates the possibility that the Gnostic attitudes have a real, not metaphorical, ideological and sociological consistency and that their roots can be found beyond the communist experience. They can be tracked back all the way to the pre-formative conditions of Romanian modernization, which is generally seen as a profound break with the Ottoman, post-Byzantine, inherently non-Western history of the Danubian Principalities. We start from the assumption that the cultural layers on which modern Romania was built should be considered as an important mould of the modernization process, during which the Gnostic attitudes have taken their earliest shape. Our paper will show how these preconditions could account for some of the “Gnostic” attitudes and to some of the illiberal behaviors of the intellectual groups that have succeeded in Romania since the beginning of the 19th Century. In our main argument we will make use of Czeslaw Milosz’s metaphor of the “ketman”, a social type the Polish author proposed for explaining the adaptive intellectual behaviors to the Soviet dominated Communist regimes of the 1950s. Milosz’s concept was a creative interpretation and

application to the communist realities of the practices adopted by some Iranian Muslims, who practiced a secret cult or religion in the guise of an exterior flawless Muslim orthodoxy. With Milosz, we believe that this concept should count as more than a distant metaphor. Furthermore, we think that the ketman concept is particularly relevant ideologically and sociologically for those countries and cultures that in addition to being colonized by the Soviets had also experienced the Muslim Ottoman empire rule, as was the case of the Romanian principalities. We propose that the Romanian intellectual Gnostic attitudes, especially its fascination with “secret knowledge” and the sophistic reversal of the “real” and “unreal”, of “essential” and “fleeting”, could have emerged from the past of submission of Romanian upper (and educated) classes to a Muslim power, seen, in traditional Orthodox terms, as fundamentally un-holly. In our view, this historical experience shaped the constitutive myth of the Romanian educated classes who see themselves as “latent crusaders.” Our paper will discuss some of the early 17th-early 19th century intellectual productions, which reveal a “latent crusader” attitude among the Romanian intellectual groups. In the process we will also demonstrate that this attitude is quite remote from the usual stereotypical interpretation of the Romanian spirit as one totally open to negotiated compromise. While the paper cannot exhaust the implications of this basic hypothesis, its main goal is to start a debate on the intellectual, theological and cultural foundational matrix of the Romanian modernizing process and on its profound historical influence.

PETER FRITZSCHE

The Conceit of Modernity

The paper examines how modernity self-identified itself at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a condition marked by temporal discontinuity and rupture, more or less incommensurate spatially differentiated national traditions, and a sensibility of disenchantment which marked off the West from the non-West. It introduces modernity's historical consciousness.

ROGER GRIFFIN

(Western) Modernity + Anti- (existing)Modernity='Modernism' (?)

This keynote proposes that hosting a major international and interdisciplinary conference in Bucharest in 2008 is timely because the socio-political and intellectual emancipation of national cultures in post-Soviet Eastern Europe (keen to make sense of their unique modern histories without authoritarian blinkers) has coincided with a number of major advances in our understanding of particular aspects the modern age. This can be illustrated in an Anglophone context by growing sophistication in analysing the dynamics of ideology (e.g. Michael Freeden); Nazism (Ian Kershaw, Michael Burleigh) the Holocaust (Christopher Browning, Zygmunt Bauman); Fascism (Emilio Gentile); political religion (Hans Maier) and its relationship to totalitarianism (Emilio Gentile, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, *Compass: Political Religion*), generic fascism

(Stanley Payne, myself); communism (Bernice Rosenthal); the temporalities of modernity (Peter Osborne, Peter Schleifer), post-secularization, re-enchantment and post-secularity (John Gray, Michael Burleigh, Charles Taylor); the scientization of eugenics and biopolitics (Paul Weindling, Marius Turda).

The transdisciplinary ethos created by such developments and openness to the convergence of paradigms and clustering of concepts it promotes, especially among younger scholars, has fostered a greater recognition of the way so many apparently unrelated modern phenomena share a common palingenetic drive towards a new artistic, social, political or historical order (nomos) in order to restore a sense of transcendence and overcome decadence. Examples of this new wave of scholarship are the works of Tod Presner on Zionism, Adam Tooze on the Nazi economy, and Bernice Rosenthal on Stalinism, as well as recent exhibitions on modernism held at the Victoria and Albert Museum and the British Library. It is in this context that the deficiencies of the old paradigm of “modern”; and “anti-modern” / “progressive” / “reactionary” have been exposed. This has liberated the concept “modernism” from its aesthetic-cultural ghetto so that it can now acquire unprecedented heuristic value as a generic term for human bids in every area of human endeavour to counteract and neutralize the disembedding, nihilistic thrust of modernity and inaugurate a new futurity, a new reality, a new nomos. It can now evoke a striving towards transcendence and the erection of a new “sacred canopy”, whether at the level of almost hermetic aesthetic understanding or of a major experiment in engineering a new society undertaken by a self-proclaimed new order.

In different ways both the Romanian Iron Guard and Islamism illustrate the potential of the subsuming anti-modernity under the concept modernism within the new

dispensation of the human sciences and the international academic community embodied at this conference. The key question then becomes, in Kantian terms, whether the new paradigm is emerging within a modernity which will prove to have been humankind's protracted palingenesis (and hence a doomed attempt at self-renewal after the erosion and destruction of traditional societies and their *nomoi*), or the harbinger of an eventual metamorphosis which combines the awesome scientific and technocratic power of modernity with the sustainability of most traditional societies. If so it would be a synthesis which is only speciously Hegelian, and marking the temporary salvation of human history after self-inflicted ecological and economic catastrophes, not its 'end'.

KEITH HITCHINS

The Challenge of Modernism: The Orthodox Response in Interwar Southeastern Europe

My paper is concerned with the extent to which Orthodox religious doctrine and cultural teachings influenced the thinking of numerous intellectuals about national identity and development and thus about modernism in Romania, Yugoslavia (Serbia), and Bulgaria between the two World Wars. These intellectuals, in many ways conservative, were suspicious of "Europe," that is, of the West, precisely because it represented modernism and thus threatened their own, often idealized, views of their own traditional, "organic" societies. There are obvious parallels in the thinking of the Romanians Nichifor Crainic, Nae Ionescu, and Dumitru

Stăniloae, the Serbs Nikolaj Velimirović, Justin Popović, and Vladimir Dvorniković, and the Bulgarians Luka Sapundzhiev, Stefan Tsanov, and D. Penov, but what is striking is the absence of a robust Orthodoxist current in Bulgaria similar to that in Romania and Serbia. Alongside these committed Orthodoxists were other thinkers who indeed recognized the contribution Orthodoxy had made to the development of their respective nations, but who took of view of spiritual and social development that went well beyond the bounds of Orthodoxy. Lucian Blaga and Mircea Eliade in Romania and Yanko Yanev in Bulgaria are representative of this perspective. By way of conclusion, this paper will suggest where Orthodoxist thought lies in the general intellectual ferment of the period and, in particular, among the reactions to modernism.

AUGUSTIN IOAN

Built Romanianness: The Century-Old Obsession with “National Identity”

Searching for a national identity in architecture, Ion Mincu had find out that, much as the concept of nation itself, such an identity had to be invented artificially, building on the idea of collective memory and the nostalgia for medieval and vernacular architecture.

However, unlike the language which was consistently the same, without dialects or regional idioms, the vernacular architecture of the ethnic Romanians was rather diverse in the historic provinces of Romania. With perhaps one

exception: it consistently and thoroughly lacked grandeur, and therefore was somewhat “useless” as sources for “genuinely Romanian” urban/monumental edifices. The closest think to monuments that the architects could find in the past were the monasteries, but they were “unreliable” sources in terms of informing the present identity. Why? Ethnicity was a key issue in understanding the way nationalism was imagined in the epoch - of both their patrons and builders. These edifices were either erected in the medieval times by master-masons coming from Serbia (in Wallachia), Armenia and Georgia (in Moldavia) for a church hierarchy that was of various ethnic backgrounds; or were predominantly Greek Catholic, (such as the wooden churches in Transylvania)...

CLAUDE KARNOUOH

Tradition and Modernity: Notes on an Old Debate

Presentation in French. Simultaneous translation
by **SORIN ANTOHI** if necessary.

Ce titre avancé ainsi, tout de go, relève d'un cliché répété à satiété jusqu'à la nausée par les sciences humaines contemporaines tant il est évident que rares sont les textes où le problème de la tradition est abordé frontalement dans la violence de sa vérité.

D'emblée, il convient de souligner que sous nos climats, le mot-référent “tradition” renvoie immédiatement au passé, à un passé dépassé, trépassé et mis en conserve dans les musées. En effet, dès lors que la “tradition” renvoie à une pensée-action (théorie-praxis) vérifiable par son agir et rien

d'autre, celle-ci est simplement non interrogée comme projet de vie personnelle et collective : elle se présente à la conscience ainsi, comme "normalité". En sa présence effective se manifeste et se tient l'être-là de la communauté en son ipséité. C'est son seul mode-à-être-dans-le-monde à la fois comme présence empirique et vérité intemporelle. Or, cette double modalité du mode-à-être-dans-le-monde de la tradition la rend très difficile à entendre à nos esprits qui, en nos langues modernes, énoncent le seul rapport analytique qu'ils conçoivent, celui de l'objet dans la certitude du sujet qui le formule, y compris, et surtout, lorsque la pensée s'arme du doute cartésien ou celui de kierkegaardien.

Il faudra aussi tenter de saisir où se tiendrait la fin de la tradition... Fin du monde grec, fin du monde latin, fin de la chrétienté médiéval et découverte de l'Amérique, naissance du capitalisme ? etc.

Il appert que la modernité est toujours perçue comme l'avènement de l'objectivation, ou mieux le rapport sujet/objet de la métaphysique moderne... et cela a mené à la quête de l'infinité objectale qui dans la pratique moderne devient aussi bien l'infinité de l'innovation-production de l'industrie (capitaliste ou socialiste), que celle des objets d'étude des sciences humaines.

Les interprétations contemporaines de la tradition en termes d'antimodernisme révèlent la crise de la pensée moderne! Dans un aphorisme posthume, Nietzsche écrivait que la tradition ne prétend pas désigner ce qui est Beau, Bon et Juste pour l'homme, mais simplement ce qui doit être relaté, révélé, révéral, exposé (montré) et accompli, et qui doit l'être ainsi et non autrement, c'est-à-dire, qui ne supporte pas de variation hormis celles inhérentes à son propre programme. En d'autres mots la tradition n'avance jamais de valeurs esthétiques ou morales¹, elle appelle à la formulation de

paroles et à la réalisation de gestes qui, par métaphore, métonymie et symbolismes divers cherche à réacheminer une société vers ce qu'elle conçoit comme devoir être la complétude de l'être de son étant. C'est pourquoi, pour entendre ces cultures, il conviendrait d'élaborer de véritables herméneutiques du sens, qui écarterait ce que Derrida a appelé les "équivalents domestiques". C'est seulement à partir d'un tel travail préalable que l'on peut déterminer et qualifier les domaines de l'universalité-identité et ceux des différences entre les cultures humaines.

On pourrait dire suivant Heidegger et Walter Otto que dans le rapport du mythos au logos celui-ci, comme parole classificatoire et conceptuelle, comme origine de la séparation objet/sujet, prépara le déploiement de la modernité, compris dans son aspect radical de capitalisme de troisième type. Si l'on veut rapporter l'énoncé du mythos et l'agir du rite à une métaphore grammaticale (en effet, quoi de plus éloquent que la grammaire des verbes pour parler de la temporalité!) j'oserai avancer que la parole du mythos et l'agir du rite dans la tradition travaillent sur le mode du futur antérieur: il faut impérativement que demain soit identique à ce qu'avant-hier fut. C'est ainsi que la tradition conçoit l'histoire (i.e. le passé) en reconstruisant l'éternisation de la communauté.

Ce qui compte pour nous au premier chef, c'est de saisir comment les gens se pensent eux-mêmes dans la singularité de leurs actions individuelles et collectives. La tradition est donc cette opération à la fois mythique, rituelle, symbolique et matérielle, mondaine et extra-mondaine, faite de mots disant le vrai par le seul fait d'être énoncés, de gestes solennels ou triviaux chargés de sens spéciaux, parfois détournés du sens quotidien (cf. Hocquart, Kings and Councillors), de matériaux fabriqués philtres, amulettes,

masques, bijoux (cf. Malinowski, *Les Argonautes du Pacifique Occidental*) ou d'outils conçus comme des pièges (cf. Remo Gudieri *Trois essais sur les pièges et les outils*, *Carnets-Livres*, Le Puy-en-Velay, 2008).

La tradition serait, selon des styles certes différents, ce déploiement de dires et de gestes où se donne la démesure, parfois la plus extrême douleur (circoncisions, excisions, travail d'épreuves réalisé sur le corps comme les rites des Mandans peints par Catlin, ayant servi de canevas au remarquable film *A Man called Horse*), les couleurs puissantes des maquillages, les bruits répétitifs des musiques, les consommations d'alcool et de drogues, où se joue parfois la mort. Ce qui, dans la pensée nietzschéenne, n'est autre que le dionysiaque... Les sauvages nous en ont donné de multiples incarnations et l'anthropologie, aveuglée par la pensée positiviste de la science en a repoussé la leçon.

Aussi lorsque l'on se trouve confronté aux discours antimodernistes qui argumentent toujours la volonté explicite de lutter contre la modernité, d'en dénier les effets en usant de tous les moyens intellectuels et institutionnels propres à cette modernité, il n'y a là qu'une autre version de la modernité. Nul ne peut échapper à la temporalité de la modernité en rédigeant des livres d'histoire, des thèses (avec des notes en bas de page !), des essais, des pamphlets, des romans, des pièces de théâtre, du cinéma, des spectacles folkloriques, qui sont, bonnes ou mauvaises des formes modernes de la narrativité. Ces actions s'apparentent à la catharsis aristotélicienne, laquelle n'a jamais représenté un quelconque rite de la tradition.

Au bout du compte il nous faut bien constater que déplorer n'a jamais été restaurer ni même capable d'entraîner une quelconque résurrection! La Renaissance italienne et son retour aux formes gréco-latines, la Réforme et son retour à

la “pureté” d’une relecture des Évangiles n’ont réussi jamais à recréer l’Aufklärung athénien ou le temps du christianisme primitif!

Le constater et l’interpréter nous éclaire certes, mais ne nous libère point de l’errance hypermoderne du progrès, du bruit et du fracas des machines, de la pollution, de la crise de l’énergie, de la présence totalitaire du plein, de la dictature de la forme-marchandise incarnée par les montagnes d’objets à vendre. C’est cela catastrophe du quotidien moderne écrivait naguère Benjamin. Oui, eût pu lui répondre Heidegger, mais cette catastrophe a eu lieu de très longue date... depuis la fin de la tradition... et le discours antimoderniste n’est pas l’un des moindre qui a contribué à intensifier la catastrophe...

ERWIN KESSLER

On De-modernization

De-modernization is the active, productive anti-modernism. Anti-modernism is a matter of (sometimes changing) thoughts, ideas and ideologies. De-modernization is a matter of culture and civilization, of persistent, enduring facts, institutions and embodied representations. Anti-modernist discourse can be a counterpoise to the excessive ideal of radical, modernist progress. Contrariwise, a de-modernized culture or, even more, a de-modernized civilization accepts no counterpoise. Anti-modernism is reactive, whereas de-modernization is (de)constructive. Anti-modernism characterizes a rhetorical space of bipolar dispute. De-modernization builds a real world of monochord consent.

Romanian civilization of the 20th century has passed through three major moments of cultural, political and social de-modernization processes.

1. The first moment was subsequent to World War One, especially characterizing the early 1920s, when a powerful wave of neo-traditionalism has covered most of the cultural art scene. Neo-traditionalist de-modernization was twofold reactive: on one hand, it was a social and political anti-liberal reaction of discontent to the catastrophic impact of the war, perceived as the natural outcome of a failing liberal democracy. On the other hand, the cultural neo-traditionalism was a reaction to the burgeoning avant-garde whose cosmopolitan and libertarian values seemingly threatened the very authentic roots of the national psyche. Neo-traditionalism, the cultural and artistic idiom it developed, was anti-liberal, anti-industrial, ruralist, nationalistic and spiritualist, anti-avant-gardistic.

2. The second moment was subsequent to the World War Two, specific to the socialist realism imposed by the Communist regime. It also was anti-liberal and anti-avant-gardistic, but, moreover, it was anti-capitalistic, progressist, industrialist, internationalist, and atheistic. Socialist-realist de-modernization was not really reactive, but rather normative and creative. It elaborated on a cultural idiom that represented itself as the most ideologically advanced embodiment of a de-modernized, idealized social corpus. Consequently, the cultural de-modernization shaped the future social de-modernization, proposing a canon of imposed and accepted norms of representation, values and aspirations.

3. The third moment was subsequent to the December 1989 revolution, and it was largely specific to the transitional society, the one leaving the Communist framework for the democratic one. This time, cultural de-modernization referred

to the massive appeal of the neo-Orthodoxist movement, that was nationalist, spiritualist, anti-avant-gardistic, passeistic, and anti-liberal. Like in the case of the other two moments of de-modernization, the neo-Orthodoxist one supported a reactive ideology that identified the previous, Communist regime with an unwanted, distorting modernization whose effects should be eradicated, for the benefit of the older, repressed values. Yet, these were not necessarily the pluralist democratic values, but rather the authoritative ones of the resurrected national, religious tradition.

PATRICIA LEIGHTEN

Abstracting Anarchism: Elisée Reclus, František Kupka, and the Project of Modernist Art

František Kupka—renowned as the first completely abstract artist in Europe—was a leading figure in the Parisian avant-garde before World War I. A prominent political cartoonist, he repeatedly attacked Church and state as authorities who wage war on society and all the forces of life on behalf of capitalism. This paper considers how Kupka's art and art theories mingle anarchism, science and theosophy to unite his work as an anarchist satirist with his avant-garde abstractions, pitting his modernism against the emerging structures of modernity. As a close associate of anarchist theorist and geographer Elisée Reclus—author of *L'Homme et la terre* (1905-06) for which Kupka did the polemical illustrations—Kupka was studiedly critical of the social and political status quo. For him, society was structured to privilege not just the wealthy but money itself, resulting in

violence at every level of experience through the combined forces of the state, the military, the Church and the “naturalized” economy they protected. His work compares the Inquisition’s torture of women to the forces of poverty that create the prostitute, and opposed both to the créatrice as regenerative in a future anarchist utopia, in harmony with the universe. In the radical avant-garde abstractions he began around 1910, he was preoccupied with alternative images of women as generative and creative, and not in the merely childbearing sense. Themes of “free love”, liberated sexuality, and naturism were all part of a contemporaneous anarchist feminism of which Kupka's art and thought is emblematic. His various artistic styles interestingly parallel these images: Kupka's early narrative cartoons are drawn in a naturalist style, while his avant-garde works are painted in an aggressively primitivist style, evoking the natural force of his artistic vision. Sometimes quite literally inversions of the violence depicted in his dystopic cartoons, such natural forces become the “subjects” of the nonobjective works, whose forms were meant to hasten the change of consciousness necessary for a new society.

ATTILA MELEGH

Modernism and Antimodernism as a False Dichotomy in the Context of the Global Hierarchies of the 20th Century

The paper will reintegrate some of the modernist and anti-modernist ideas between in the first half of the 20th century

concerning rural development and population development in Europe and partially in Latin America and India. The key point of the paper is to set up such a comparative framework in which these dichotomies become different perspectives in the system of hierarchical worldviews instead of essentialized antagonisms.

The paper will look at ideas on fertility and population control as related to the social situation of peasantry being a prime focus of “scientific” and political discourses throughout the world. The paper will set up historical periods in this development and will show what historically specific elements of modernist (pro-progress, pro-urban, anti-natalist, pro-control) versus anti-modernist (questioning progress, anti-urban, pro-peasant, pro-natalist, anti-control) ideas can be understood as local developments and what elements could be put into a comparative framework. The separation of structural (relational) and the historically specific elements is of paramount importance in order to continue the debate over development of ideas in a world hierarchically configured both in terms of economic and cognitive structures.

ANASTASIA NIKOLOPOULOU

Melodrama's Modern Illnesses and Cures: From Coleridge to Peter Brooks, 1916-1975

In 1816, Coleridge launched a scathing critique against Charles Robert Maturin's *Bertram*, or, *the Castle of St Aldobrand* for introducing the modern Jacobinical drama in

England, and for subverting the orders of morality, family, and the church. The whole secret of the modern Jacobinical drama and its popular appeal to plebeian audiences, he argued, was in subverting the natural order of things. Referring to “modern English plays”, he lamented that they, like other modern literary forms, offered a fragmented and disjointed view of events and a mechanized language that allowed little space for reflection and produced a reader-spectator of vacuous thoughts.

Around a hundred fifty years later, Peter Brooks in *The Melodramatic Imagination* argued that melodrama’s disjointed language was a token of modernist consciousness. Instead of Jacobinical ideas, Brooks claimed that melodrama’s fragmentary discourse represented the desacralized remnants of a sacred myth that had been demolished. He undertook the task of restoring melodrama’s rightful place in modern literature and culture.

In this paper I will question what the cultural and historical factors were that made Coleridge and Brooks want to domesticate melodrama, either by neutralizing its political content or by erasing its historicopolitical context. I will further explore the ways in which Brooks invented a fictive account of the formulaic aspects of melodrama that overwrite Coleridge’s earlier criticism by rendering melodrama apolitical and ahistorical. I will explore why Brooks’ critical idiom of melodrama has had such a successful appeal among film and literature critics, the majority of whom, like Brooks, rely on formulaic interpretations rather than on a sociohistorical reading of the genre.

At the outset, both Brooks and Coleridge wrote their critical essays on melodrama’s modernity in the aftermath of social and political upheavals; urban and agrarian disturbances in

1816, with a resurfacing of Luddite movements; the aftermath of civil rights movements in the mid 1970s. While Coleridge sought to foster readers who would shun the temptations of popular culture and would instead develop themselves into an institution that would lead the emerging audiences of the nineteenth century, as Jon Klancher has pointed out, Brooks fostered readers who could be trained to interpret powerful symbolic interpretations and transcend what Brooks calls the “transindividual” domains of politics and history. But what sets Brooks apart in his analysis of melodrama is his indebtedness to Freud and psychoanalysis.

In his essay on Wolfman meeting Freud in 1918, Brooks points out how the Wolfman’s story, bound up with the “cataclysmic history of the modern era,” consists in an inner history resolutely fixed on the past, which, caught in the labyrinth of personal disasters, amounted to an infantile neurosis. All these, Brooks notes, are innate phenomena of the modern thought and modern literature. Freud’s task in modern thought is to put together the fragments and shattered memories in a manner that is coherent and reminiscent of nineteenth century historiography, which was necessary for Freud to understand the “aetiology of neurosis.”

Drawing upon Brooks essay on the Wolfman, I will try to explicate Brooks’s interpretive method on melodrama and understand what prompted him to want to restore the genre to the modernist canon as well as to ignore melodrama’s political function. Brooks says nothing in *The Melodramatic Imagination* about the plebeian, and in their majority artisan audiences and their political behaviour in the theatre, such as the Old Price Riots.

I will argue that Brooks invents a story about nineteenth century melodrama just as Freud invented a story about the

Wolfman. Brooks is at pains to create “origins” for melodrama and he feels he must go back to Rousseau to trace the genesis of melodrama.

In Brooks, modernity and modern thought, as well as modern subjectivity and modern literature and drama consist in the capacity of the critic or interpreter to stitch together seemingly fragmented events and narratives into a master narrative that could a) reveal everything and b) uncover the origin of everything. He argues that melodrama’s “excess” bears resemblance to the unconscious mind, so he undertakes to analyze melodrama in order to discover the origins of its unconscious, and from that point on to create a master narrative that fully explains the genre.

In Brooks’ *The Melodramatic Imagination*, melodrama becomes a patient suffering from a certain illness – an infantile neurosis. For Brooks melodrama became (via Freud) an excellent case of the nineteenth century unconscious, in which urgent need of cure of its fragments and unspoken fantasies, tormenting phobias and fairytales of childhood manifested the genre’s modernism. Brooks, like Freud, unpacks the “layered”, narratives of melodrama, as dreams and obsessional symptoms, which Brooks calls melodramatic “excess”. But one may ask, what is it that Brooks wanted to cure melodrama from? Brooks argues that melodrama, when it was first performed in the minor theatres as low culture was suffering from lack of self consciousness about its own illusions. For, as he says in the essay on the Wolfman, what is truly modernist about Freud’s analysis of the Wolfman is that there cannot be disillusion. We are all bound to illusions, Brooks argues, and the most we can do about it is to situate ourselves knowingly within the symbolic order. The public sphere is nothing more than what Brooks calls “transindividual orders”, regardless of

political, cultural, or historical events. They are mere illusions, ripple effects around the subject which struggles to redirect its existence towards them.

The Melodramatic Imagination put willingly in the place of the patient not just a popular genre but several generations of artisan and working class audiences as well, whose tastes concealed their “illness” – their attachment to their sociohistorical situation. By remedying this longing for sociohistorical referents in artisan and working class culture – referents which permeate thousands of melodramas performed throughout the nineteenth century – Brooks releases melodrama from the grip of historical and political events of Luddism, industrialization, and class conflict, and places it on the pedestal of modernist aesthetic.

RĂZVAN PĂRĂIANU

Romanian National Culture as an Antimodernist Project

Around the turn of the nineteenth century, the foundation of modern political thought came under increasing criticism from a young generation disenchanted by the faults of the liberal establishment. In this period, various theories attempted to recreate the modern world in order to reconcile the present with what was perceived as national tradition and culture. Accordingly, the public spirit was gradually reoriented toward notions and beliefs associated with the need of a new beginning, a rebirth of national development, which should avoid the evils of modern civilization. Yet, in Central and Eastern Europe, under the circumstances of the collapse of the multinational empires, this current of thought

was generally overshadowed by the nation-state creation process, the criticism of the young generation being subsumed in a way or another to what was thereafter perceived as a normal part of the so-called national movement. Therefore, the national historiographies find it uneasy to interpret the various extreme right movements of the 1930s. This is particularly true about those classics of national literature who deeply inspired the right wing political radical movements, and who constantly were exempted them from a more critical approach and a deeper analysis of their political heritage. Even in those cases in which a prominent intellectual was engaged in a radical political party, these phenomena were described as rather a mere *déravage*, an unintended or contextual fault based on a mixture of good intentions, misunderstandings, disappointment and despair.

The present paper addresses one of the most equivocal notions, but not less effective, which was created as a powerful weapon against the political establishment prior to the First World War. It was the notion of national culture that played this role, namely a (re)definition the social body of the nation, its enemies and the kind of leadership needed for this national body. The concept of national culture was present in various public and political debates, particularly in those countries where the social elite was educated in foreign universities, legitimized by state institution, and eventually constrained to collaborate with the central and local administration. In this case, it was not surprising that modernity itself was not ethnically neutral and that the national movement fought under the arms of anti-modernism. In order to address the role played by the cultural criticism in political discourse and to evaluate its heritage for the radical movements in the next decades after the First World War, this paper analyzes the case of the

Transylvanian Romanians in the late nineteenth century in relation to the cultural milieu of Budapest and Vienna and other university cities where young intellectuals used to be educated. Then, it refers to other cultural models such as Germany, Italy, France and Poland, which exercised a certain fascination in the next decades over the young generation, and nonetheless, the etho-racial theories about culture, cultural character, and racial traits developed as a political argument in favor of a national revolution in the late 1930's. In conclusion, this paper suggests that the concept of national culture and the implicit cultural criticism, used to play the role of a general background that permanently enforced, inspired and (re)shape the various radical ethno political theories until the beginning of the Second World War. The appeal to national culture was the easiest way to reach a certain solidarity and a minimum of social consensus in a world perceived as decayed, fragmented, alienated, etc. It was the leitmotif of most revolutionary movements, particularly of those of neo-conservative inspiration.

VICTOR RIZESCU

Developmental Ideology or Regenerative Nationalism? Competing Strands of the Romanian Right Before World War Two

The various right wing designs envisioned in interwar Europe spoke contradictory ideological languages cast in the mold of both progressive, forward looking and retrogressive, anti-modern, visions. Some advocates of such political

projects were especially concerned with the shortcomings of relative backwardness and accordingly acted as devoted “developmentalists”, meant at discovering organizational means for mobilizing the resources of their nations such as to enable them to shortcut the process of structural change on the path of modernization. Some others pointed to the cultural malaise issuing from both the inherent traps of modernity and its imitative adaptations as to the main source of evil, and accordingly turned into supporters of backward looking, “regenerative” nationalist revolutions.

Interwar Romania displayed a powerful strand of neo-romantic Kulturkritik nourishing a nationalist revival that eventually found its way into the political stream of Iron Guard fascism. Not all promoters of this political solution, however, took the same views to such issues as urban development, industrialization and structural modernization of agriculture. Some of them came strikingly close, in their favorable assessment of such modernizing goals, to their sometime fellow travelers of right wing politics grouped around the banner of corporatism. In their turn, the advocates of the corporatist program drew heavily from the favorite themes of fascist culture, international and local alike.

It is precisely the partial overlapping yet sharply differentiating relationship between these two ideological families that the paper is intended to explore. Whether fascism was a modern or an anti-modern departure in political thought is a question often asked in too general terms to allow for a detailed study, from this standpoint, of national or regional variations. An older stage of the debate on the topic tended to ascribe the two paradigmatic cases of Italy and Germany to the “modernist” and respectively “anti-modern” categories of radical right ideologies and regimes. More recently, the category of “modernism” itself

has been refashioned in such a way as to cover all late nineteenth and early twentieth century reactions against the ills of “consummated” modernity. By looking at the reciprocal contamination between corporatist designs with strong Italian connections and fascist rhetoric patterned on the model of German and Central European politics of cultural despair, this paper is meant to re-question the nature of interwar European right wing revolution.

Tracing the local sources of Romanian corporatism is a particular target of the paper. Indeed, while indebted to foreign ideas and contributing to their further international expansion, it displays a local pedigree rooted in the older developmental ideology of liberalism articulated around the middle of the nineteenth century and re-elaborated under the label of “neoliberalism” in the 1920’s. Staying at the crossroads of mainstream modernizing projects and fascist anti-systemic politics, corporatism emerges as particularly revealing for the inner characteristics of both.

MIHAI SPĂRIOSU

Utopia, Exile, and Ludic Liminality in Modernism and Postmodernism

In the past century both utopia and exile have received increasing attention in the humanities mainly as a result of three factors: the massive human dislocations before and after the two world wars; the division of the political world into two antagonistic ideological camps as a result of these wars; and, more recently, the breakdown and fragmentation of the binary global power system, where a number of postcolonial and fundamentalist religious and nationalistic forces vie for local

or regional hegemony with the remaining “superpower.” Utopia and exile, however, have never been seen in correlation and have seldom been considered in a general sociocultural and philosophical context. My paper starts from the general premise that in Western culture utopia and exile have often acted as instruments of a mentality of power and that they both can be seen as forms of ludic liminality. Furthermore, I shall argue that whereas literary modernist works often remain trapped within a mentality of power by harking back nostalgically to archaic forms of it, certain postmodernist works explore the possibility of opening utopia and exile to an alternative mode of thought and behavior, outside a mentality of power, precisely by taking full advantage of the ludic-liminal nature of the literary and artistic phenomena in general. I shall make my case by briefly discussing two literary masterpieces of the twentieth century: Hesse’s *Magister ludi* and Thomas Mann’s *Joseph and his Brothers*. Despite their pronounced anti-utopian stance, the two works paradoxically allow a positive reevaluation of utopia and exile as atopia, that is, as an experience of the void or emptiness. Far from seeing it as negative and threatening, they view this experience as a unique opportunity to explore the unknown. Thus, for them atopia is a ludic liminal activity which often opens up a neutral space or no man’s land where alternative systems of values may emerge.

MARIA STAVRINAKI

War, Modernism, and Apocalypse: The Ambivalences of the Sacral

The experience of the Great War has taken two main forms in the writings of Walter Benjamin. On the one hand, the formulation of the “poverty of experience” [*Erfahrung* und

Armut], which was a consequence itself of the technological war and which signified the incapacity of modern man to “transmit” his experiences to others. On the other hand, in his 1930 recension of Ernst Jünger's *Krieg und Krieger*, Benjamin had analyzed the premises, the function and the consequences of the mystical interpretations of a war described as “metaphysical and abstract”. The deliberate contempt of the concrete and materialist aspects of war were legitimating, according to Benjamin, the sacralization of the war, in the same way that they were fabricating the necessity to struggle against an invisible enemy. If the “poverty of experience” allowed the theorisation of “a positive barbarity”, which Benjamin detected in the “best minds” of his time, his reflections on the mystical and metaphysical war would lead him to the concept of the war as the very climax of the “estetization of politics” carried out by fascism. My conference will follow some constellations of this mystical war in the avant-gardes, namely in futurism, cubism and expressionism. I will be attached to the concept of the apocalyptic temporality, understood both as the interruption of evolutionary time and as the dialectics of destruction and construction. Exploring some works of art and texts, written by artists and critics, I will try to analyze the links, and even the overlapping, between the apocalyptic temporality and abstraction. As Roger Caillois has argued, the « abstract war », a product itself of the rationalization of modern times, has taken, by its very emancipation from a direct human agent, the character of the sacral and the archaic.

Radical Discourses of Identity in Interwar East Central Europe: Political Romanticism, Konservative Revolution, and Anti-Modernism

Studying the relationship of the patterns of historical representation and the growing infatuation with “national essence” is crucial to understand the radicalization of nationalism in East Central Europe that reached its peak in the 1930s. This era witnessed the emergence of a new kind of political discourse rooted in a new vision of temporality, that posed a challenge to the institutionalized frameworks of politics which emerged in the late-nineteenth century. In many ways, this new ideological configuration returned to the pattern of “national romanticism”, with certain intellectual groups seeking to devise a normative imagery of the nation and then impose it on the nationally yet “unconscious” population – but the emancipatory connotations of the romantic discourse became over-written by the homogenizing overtones of integral nationalism. On the other hand, a crucial problem of interpreting the radical identity politics emerging in the inter-war period in Europe is how to describe a discursive rupture. While conservatives in the nineteenth century were mainly focusing on the “ancien régime”, and advocated a political, social and institutional continuity with the pre-modern structures, after the First World War the conservative agenda came to be entrenched in the profound feeling of a breach of continuity. This is why one can describe this political tradition in the seemingly paradoxical terms of a “conservative revolution”.

It was a reaction exactly to the crisis of the institutions of political modernity: a revolt against modernity “from within”, politicizing its aesthetic categories. This development needs to be contextualized in view of the broader shift of European intellectual culture in the 1920-30s, marked by the collapse of linear visions of development. Looking at the East Central European contexts, the paper thus seeks to revisit the recent debates on the problem of modernism and anti-modernism, focusing on the models of historicity implied by these radical discourses of identity.

MARIUS TURDA

Modernism and Visions of National Perfection

Despite a wealth of existing literature, the history of race and eugenics continues to attract a diverse range of scholars, from historians to biologists and philosophers. This affluence and interdisciplinary convergence has not only furthered an increased awareness of diverse traditions of racial and eugenic thought, both defunct and active, but also prompted scholars to carefully examine established scholarly paradigms determining these traditions. This constant need for critical incisiveness is by no means an effortless exercise, as demonstrated by recent publications on race and eugenics.

Has race, as cultural, social and biological symbol, survived decades of scientific and public denunciation, only to resurface surreptitiously in current attempts to fashion public alertness about our genetically obsessed societies? Moreover, is there a connection between biopolitics and eugenics? Furthermore, what led so many scientists of the

twentieth century to believe in eugenics? And, finally, does eugenics still have a place in twenty-first century discussions on genetic engineering, cloning and genomics?

In this paper I look at traditions of racial modernist thought which derived from the general European debate about the nation during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries remained nevertheless alive in Romania during the first half of the twentieth century, influencing not only narratives of national identity but also a number of ideologies, like racism and eugenics, and scientific disciplines like anthropology and history. The intention here is not to replace the nation with race in the existing historiographic narratives but to assert the centrality of the latter within definitions of national identity produced in Romania between 1880 and 1945. As a result of the gradual dissemination of evolutionary and racial ideas during the nineteenth century, the nation acquired a physical structure: it was portrayed as a living organism, functioning according to biological laws, and embodying great physical qualities, symbols of innate virtues transmitted from generation to generation. This form of corporeal nationalism coexisted with other forms of identity such as religion, language or shared historical experiences. It is this fluid relationship between race and nation that this paper hopes to locate within discussions on national character, national culture and national territory in Romania.

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